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Abstract 
The criminal liability of legal persons is an intrinsic reality of everyday life. However, 
this particular institution had a rather tumultuous evolution which is essential in 
understanding its organic mechanisms.  
Through this study we aim to analyze the concept of criminal liability of the legal 
person from both diachronic and comparative perspective in order to determine the role of 
this fiction in contemporary legal systems. We shall focus on the legal framework in both 
European and Anglo-American systems. We also intend to identify the factors that have led to 
the consecration of criminal liability.   
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Introduction  
In order to understand the inner mechanisms of the legal person, it is essential to 
analyze it both from the perspective of public law and of private law, as well.  
One of the most controversial aspect regarding the criminal law institution is, 
undoubtedly, the liability of the entities. We perceive it in the same natural manner as the 
liability of individuals, neglecting, unfortunately, aspects of great importance that contribute 
to the configuration of legal entities as we known them today.  
 Romans were very attached to the idea that the legal person is very similar to the 
natural person. However, the legal person could not be held criminal responsible, fact 
enshrined also by the adagio societas delinquere non potest. Thus, Ulpian specifies that a 
municipium cannot be responsible for dolus, since it is a legal person1, i.e. a fictive entity. 
After all, the legal persons were the product of fiction, being actually nothing more than a 
legal metaphor. 
However, some authors, especially Archille Mestre, asserted that the Romans 
considered legal persons capable of committing offenses and, in consequence, they could be 
punished. In support of its sentences, the author gives the example of the town Cheronea, 
against whom a criminal legal action had been formulated. This would lead to the idea that in 
Roman law, the criminal liability of legal persons was recognized2. In fact, some of the 
residents of the town, without the entire community being involved, killed Roman citizens. 
After trial, Cheronea had been exonerated. 
In the Middle Ages, the liability of legal person remained a controversial matter. The 
general tendency has been to accept that legal person may also be criminal responsible. In the 
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context in which the Church`s role was predominantly, punishing legal person constituted a 
means of applying sanctions to those entities under public law in particular, which did not 
comply with the religious regulations. The penalty was excommunication. Pope Inocenţiu the 
6th is the one of those who argued the criminal liability of the legal person. A supporter and 
an establisher, after some authors, of the theory of fiction, he rejected the idea that an 
imaginary creation can be held liable for committing a criminal offense, as it had no free will 
and no real existence. He argued that an universitas, because it was a creation without soul 
and body, which was not a part of the Church3, may not be punished by criminal provisions. 
In Germanic law, both natural person, as well as legal person were recognized as 
being real subject of law. In the 7th century, there were established, as territorial units, 
centuries and curies. They were responsible for any criminal offenses committed on their 
territory4. Considering this, the basis of criminal sanctions was not guilt, but the consequences 
of the action. The penalty was actually a compensation, a restoration of the prejudice caused, 
more than a punishment per se. 
In France, the criminal liability of moral person was consecrated by the Criminal 
Ordinance of 1670 and it had been applied until the French Revolution. The French code of 
1810 has eliminated the criminal liability of legal persons, although it had been consecrated 
before the 8th century. But the new legislation was based on the realities of that historical 
times. After the French revolution, legal persons under private law had vanished due to the 
prohibition of freedom of association. 
The criminal liability was vehemently criticized by the ultra vires doctrine supporters. 
The sense of the syntagm ultra vires is revealed by the expression beyond the powers. 
According to this theory, the legal person is entitled only to those legal rights which had been 
specifically conferred, therefore, a legal person`s capacity is limited to the specialization of its 
object of activity. It may act only in accordance with the purpose for which it was established. 
Criminal liability would imply that committing offences must be one of the statutory 
purposes. This is, without doubt, not possible, whereas the object of an association must be in 
accordance with the law and with the morality. The 9th century, in Great Britain, this concept 
has been adopted by the court in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche. 
Before the Second World War, in Europe, despite the tradition of the Middle ages, the 
principle societas delinquere non potest continued to be applied. After the War, the judges of 
Nuremberg had not punished Germany, but the Nazi Party, which was also a legal person. 
The Netherlands was the first European country to introduce the concept of criminal 
liability of moral person, in 1976. From the last decade of the 20th century, the majority of the 
member states of the old continent followed its example. Some countries, such as Sweden and 
Greece have refused the recognition and the consolidation of criminal liability of the legal 
person. 
Germany has opted for administrative liability of collective entities. This implies that 
an offense must be related to individual - verbandsunrecht5. It is mandatory that the action is 
related to a legal obligation of the moral person and it has to have contributed to its 
enrichment. The doctrine is also known as the theory of the report of legal persons. 
In France, criminal liability of moral person has been re-introduced by the Criminal 
code of 1994 and it is based on the theory of the identification of bodies and the 
representatives with the legal person. In accordance with article 121-2 of the Criminal code 
“moral persons, except the State, are responsible under criminal law […]of the criminal 
offenses committed in their name or on their behalf, by their bodies or representatives. “(Les 
personnes morales, à l'exclusion de l'Etat, sont responsables pénalement […] des infractions 
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commises, pour leur compte, par leurs organes ou représentants.). In other words, the 
governing bodies and the representatives shall be identified with a legal entity in all legal 
relations. Whenever a crime is committed by a person outside the entity, the criminal liability 
of the collective person is not possible. Also, an employee, if he is not part of the governing 
bodies or does not act as a representative of the moral person cannot attract, by his deed, the 
criminal liability of the entity. The above reasoning is founded on theory of liability by 
“rebound”.  According to this doctrine, in order to be criminal liable it is necessary the 
offense to have been committed by a natural person. The moral person is responsible only in 
the situation in which the offense has been performed by a body or a representative, in the 
name and on its behalf. The responsibility is, therefore, of conventional nature. 
This doctrine follows the theory of functional liability, jurisprudential creation based 
on a fiction. The representatives of the entity cannot be held responsible for everything that is 
happening inside the legal person. They may be responsible only for those events regarding 
which they had a certain power or were their responsibilities. Therefore, committing a 
criminal offense shall be examined considering the functions carried out under the legal 
person`s activity. It is not punished the author of physical offense, but the one that was 
responsible, at the time of the offense, with the inspection or supervision6 of the activities 
carried out by the entity. 
But, naturally, the legal person may not be subject of all offenses. As such, Article 121 
paragraph (2) of the French Criminal Code stipulates that the legal person answers “in the 
cases provided for by law or regulation”.  The penalties applicable to the person legal are not 
the same with those for individual. These are limited provided by the law, for instance, the 
fine, the dissolution, the prohibition of carrying out particular activities for a certain period. 
A special solution was adopted by Malta. In the situation in which a criminal offense 
is presumed to have been committed by a legal person, all those who, at the time, were 
directors, managers and secretaries or occupied other similar positions or who have being 
fulfilling those functions, will be considered responsible for the criminal offense. The 
criminal liability of natural person is not active whenever he proves that he has no knowledge 
of the offense or that he has acted with due diligence to prevent the offence7. The raison of 
this solution is justified by the fact that legal person does not have a free will, therefore it is 
not likely to have criminal intentions. When the individual violates the legal regulations, 
whenever he is part of any decision-making bodies or of representation, he shall be 
responsible under criminal law. 
In Romania, criminal liability of moral person was introduced by the Law no. 
278/2006. The consecration this institution was due to the need for Romania to comply with 
European Union`s trend, as well as to respect the commitment assumed by ratifying 
international instruments and the recommendations of European Union in this respect. 
In the anglo-american system of law, criminal liability of the legal person is indirect. 
Regarding the subjective side of the offence, the doctrine has formulated the identity theory. 
Thus, the behavior of the directors or of representatives of the legal person is that of the moral 
person itself. 
The U.S.A. have been pioneers in consecrating the criminal liability of the legal 
person. This is rather surprising considering that the system of common law embraced the 
theory of fiction. Until the 18th century, this concept had been rejected with uncharacteristic 
vehemence by the American courts. They considered that by regulating such institutions, 
ridiculous situations can occur, whereas some penalties may not be applicable only to natural 
persons. For instance, the legal person cannot be incarcerated. 
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In the 19th century, corporations began to develop. The industrial revolution 
phenomenon was amplifying. The new realities have imposed the dismissal of the principle 
societas delinquere non potest. The number of criminal allegations charges by the prosecutors 
against corporations was growing. Courts were convinced, in more and more causes, of their 
arguments. Common law was changing. The Congress had interpreted the concept of person 
within the meaning of including also corporations. Therefore, criminal law was applied to all 
persons. Corporations could be held criminal responsible. For instance, in 1901, New York 
Central Railroad has been accused of aggravated murder. A fire busted in its depot, where a 
considerable amount of dynamite was held, violating, therefore, the legal rules. The explosion 
which broke out killed 6 workers8. 
Maintaining the institution of criminal liability of corporation for over two centuries in 
American law is, in many cases, justified by the particularities of the justice system. The 
defendant benefits from numerous and important procedural rights. As they are consecrated in 
the Constitution, the activity of prosecutors regarding hearing witnesses or discovering 
evidence is difficult. In case of offenses committed by the legal person, the prosecutors' 
situation is more time consuming. The confidentiality client-lawyer has been interpreted 
broadly by judges. Lawyers use, in most cases, means to slow down legal procedures, 
blocking the administration of evidence or to challenge the accusations in all procedural 
phases. By regulating the criminal liability of legal persons, there has been created an 
advantage of the prosecutors in the negotiations with corporate representatives. They may 
decide what evidence to administrate and if they drop off or not the charges. The corporation 
which collaborates with the accusation in the identification and the punishment of guilty 
natural persons, such as directors, managers, in most of the times, is no longer subject of 
sanctions. The institution`s aim is not to punish the legal person, but rather to determined it to 
cooperate with the prosecutors in catching those who are guilty9.  
In Great Britain, a premise in consecrating the criminal liability of the legal person 
had been the modification, in 1899, of Interpretation Act by including within the concept of 
person legal entities as well. English courts, had been condemning legal persons from the very 
beginning of the 19th century for accusations of nuisance – the omission or the lack of 
compliance with legal provisions. In 1840, in the case The Queen v. Birmingham and 
Gloucester Railway, the latter had been convicted for failure to obey a legal order while it had 
been required to destroy a bridge. In 1844, in The Queen v. Great North of England Railway 
Co., the company had been sanctioned for that employees who did not repaired the damaged 
road due to the construction of a railway line10. The corporation was liable for someone else's 
deed as, according to the respondent theory, a legal person can be responsible for the offenses 
committed by an employee or an agent. Therefore, the company has the obligation to comply 
itself, as well as its employees, with the legal rules. 
In Great Britain, two doctrines were fruitfully governing the criminal liability of moral 
persons: the objective and the subjective theories. The objective liability may be strict 
liability, in which it is relevant the personal offense and vicarious liability or liability for 
someone else's deed. The second form of liability is based on the idea of guilt, being a 
responsibility of subjective nature. 
In the case of the first form, it does not appear to be necessary proving the guilt - mens 
rea, whether it is intention, fault with or without provision, but it is mandatory to demonstrate 
one or all the elements of the action/inaction - actum rea. Vicarious liability, on the other 
hand, attacks the criminal liability for the crime committed by the person itself or by another 
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person who has acted with mens rea, for instance, the criminal responsibility of the moral 
person for a prohibited action committed by an employee11. 
 
Conclusions  
A factual situation does not generate legal effects until it is consecrated by legal 
provisions. Without being recognized by the law, the legal person does not legally exists. It 
remains, therefore, a fiction. By juridical recognition, the person gains rights and obligations. 
In this context, the criminal liability of legal persons is, as Professor Valeriu M. Ciucă 
stated “a postmodern implausible fiction”12. The principle of personal criminal liability is not 
susceptible of extensive interpretations. The individual has a real existence, it is not a 
metaphor of the law. Its actions are determined by its own psychological processes. He is the 
one who, by fault or intentionally, commits offenses. In this regard, we have to notice that one 
of the raisons for ending the criminal prosecution is, according to the law, the death, and not 
the dissolving of the offender. 
 A legal entity is a collective body. It has rights and obligations, but cannot substitute 
the individual. Its will is assigned by the persons who compose or manage it, therefore, the 
legal person has no personal will. In some cases, these persons are different from the one who 
commits the offence, for instance, as a representative. There are, therefore, two wills which 
become confluent only in the plan of theory, both regarding “the interest of the legal person”. 
Furthermore, in the case of Romania, the consecration of criminal liability of entities 
has been the effect of the ratification of international instruments and the commitment to the 
European Union. So, the organic premises of this institution are missing.  
In Europe, in the 20th century, when the criminal liability was recognized, premises 
that have determined the regulation of criminal liability of the legal person, did not longer 
exist. We believe that there is a need at least for the Romanian legislator to take return to its 
Roman legislative heritage, and dispense of this institution which is rather inconsistent. 
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